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Customer service "insufficient balance" CCES express fell into the vortex of bankruptcy

less than three months after Xingchen's emergency bankruptcy, another express enterprise fell into the vortex of bankruptcy. Recently, CCES (Shanghai SIES Express Co., Ltd.) sent out signs of Bankruptcy: insufficient customer service balance, paralysis of most domestic networking businesses, and difficulty in getting rid of debt

industry experts said that the small and scattered domestic express delivery enterprises, coupled with the disadvantages of the franchise model, have led to the fate of small and medium-sized express delivery enterprises facing integration, and strengthening the transformation is also an imperative measure

nearly 100 million yuan of debt is pressing

CCES entered the quasi bankruptcy state

yesterday, I called CCES express customer service and was repeatedly told that the balance dialed was insufficient. A person in charge of CCES Guangzhou Baiyun Guangyuan station surnamed Wu told that at present, CCES in Guangdong cannot deliver goods to other provinces, and the network has been paralyzed, but there is no problem in the province

no, after this storm, we should also provide effective support for the comprehensive management of the raw material industry and prepare to quit. For the current dilemma of CCES, Su Jianjian, the head of Zhongshan point in Guangdong, said that for him, joining CCES for four years is like going through a river and lake, and sooner or later he will face the fate of withdrawal

Su Jianjian told Nanfang that there are problems in the company's headquarters now. I heard that the wages of employees in Zhejiang, Shanghai and other places have not been paid for several months. However, due to the local contracting method, there are no problems in capital or reputation in Guangdong, and the business in the province has not been greatly affected for the time being

it was learned from a franchisee surnamed Wang in Suzhou that all points in Suzhou have stopped using the CCES channel. As early as three days ago, several CCES points nearby began to borrow other express delivery services to get rid of the goods. This means that its channels are paralyzed

according to public media reports, at present, CCES has actually stopped operation. Only in CCES express Hangzhou sorting center, more than 10000 pieces of goods, including Hangzhou, Wenzhou, Ningbo and Jinhua, have been confirmed. In addition, the company owes tens of millions of yuan for freight and has not paid employees' wages for three months

CCES, formerly known as Dongcheng express, was founded in 2003 and was acquired by Yuantai group, whose main business is real estate, in 2007. Insiders said that this former real estate boss had not done it before, and he would not do express delivery, so he couldn't hold out when he wanted to go public

according to the news, CCES once negotiated with Jiang Xiaogen, the former general manager of Huitong express in Guangdong, and the rear invested 200million yuan to control the shares, but the acquisition ended before it was completed. Coupled with the shutdown of the shuttle bus group, CCES suffered internal and external troubles and entered the dilemma of bankruptcy. Su Jianjian said that the debt problem was unknown. Some rumors said it was 60 or 70 million yuan, but others said it was more

Jiang Xiaogen publicly denied the acquisition to the outside world, saying that he had invested 30million yuan to take over in his own name, but he only reached an intention agreement and had not officially signed a contract. Although Yuantai group claimed that its debt was only more than 40million yuan, some media reported that its debt was as high as 170million yuan

trading price for volume leads to losses

poor management and internal cannibalism

for Su Jianjian, who has been doing CCES for four years, the brand and network channels of express delivery are very important in his eyes. CCES like brand effect mainly depends on the purchase volume of Taobao, and it will die if there is no volume

if the purchase depends on quantity, it means that consumers can only be attracted at a low price. According to an express employee in Guangzhou, the first weight of express delivery in Guangzhou is 6 yuan/kg, and the continued weight is 1 yuan/kg. Customers with a large amount can still achieve less than 5 yuan, while the first weight in the Pearl River Delta region is only 8 yuan/kg, and the continued weight is 2 yuan/kg. Even some express delivery companies have pressed each other's prices in order to win customers, resulting in surprisingly thin profits

the rise in oil, road and bridge fees, the sharp rise in labor costs, and the price war waged by various express delivery companies have reduced the gross profit of express delivery enterprises from the original 20% to 30% to less than 10%. A survey data from the China Federation of logistics and purchasing shows that at present, the revenue profit margin of logistics enterprises is about 5%

whoever raises the price first will die first, and whoever does not raise the price will die. This rumor widely spread in the express industry has become a prophecy on CCES. The above-mentioned franchisee surnamed Wang in Suzhou told that CCES was facing fierce competition in the express delivery industry. Coupled with the business downturn in the first half of this year, contradictions emerged

the franchisee surnamed Wang introduced that the loss of CCES was also due to the serious shortage of business volume. Logistics companies usually start when they are full, while small express companies are difficult to run when they are full. The vehicle load is dissatisfied, and the driver's remuneration can be paid after 40 or 50 days. The enterprise is actually at a loss

in fact, in addition to the drag of the price war, the management of CCES has also been criticized by insiders. Mr. Wang told that franchisees need to pay franchise fees ranging from several thousand yuan to tens of thousands of yuan to join express enterprises, and many unreasonable regulations formulated by the headquarters will deduct this deposit

in addition, franchisees can complain about each other. For example, if an express from South China to East China stays for one day after arriving in East China, the franchisees in South China have the right to complain to East China. Mr. Wang said that the headquarters will fine East China, and South China can also take a share of the fine, which is tantamount to encouraging us to kill each other

Xu Yong, chief consultant of China Express Consulting, told that in general, it takes 3 to 5 years for an express enterprise to jump over the threshold of loss and achieve profits, but it is difficult to achieve in an enterprise with internal conflicts such as CCES. In addition, in order to achieve rapid expansion, brand holders greatly benefit franchisees, making their own capital gap larger and larger

at present, the way of gap subsidy is mainly loans and mergers and acquisitions. In terms of loans, because express is a light asset industry, it is difficult to compete for 1959 -pope Ding A. (Popper) pointed out that fatigue life obeys lognormal distribution; In terms of mergers and acquisitions, few enterprises are willing to acquire express delivery in the franchise mode, and cess is a failed case

franchise mode is questioned

express enterprises are facing transformation choices

dds, Xingchen emergency, coupled with the current CCES, domestic express enterprises have once again demonstrated the war of expansion. The outcome of such failures is always related to a mode called franchise

it is understood that there are nearly 10000 domestic express delivery enterprises at present, but most of them are small in scale, weak in strength and low in industrial concentration. In addition to SF as a typical direct sales model, the vast majority of others adopt the franchise model to expand the market

Xu Yong told Nanfang that the dilemma faced by CCES was determined by the higher strength and modulus of carbon fiber reinforced composites in the context of China's express delivery industry. There were too many brands in China's express industry before, and the concentration was low. In the United States, 95% of the business volume is controlled by the top four express delivery enterprises, while in China, the number is 27

Xu Yong said that the development from low concentration to high concentration is the inevitable trend of the express industry in the future, which will inevitably lead to the survival of the fittest in the industry. In the next five to ten years, a certain number of enterprises will inevitably go bankrupt

Xu Yong believes that the disadvantages of the franchise model can be seen from two data. In 2012, the industry growth rate of express delivery reached 40%, but the number of complaints increased by 50% year-on-year, and the complaints caused by the franchise mode were more than 95%; Among the world's top 500 enterprises, no one operates in a franchise mode

Xu Yong told that the express industry is different from the catering industry. Franchisees not only have a vertical relationship with the headquarters, but also have a horizontal relationship with franchisees in other regions. This horizontal relationship requires cooperation between franchisees. Unfortunately, in the franchise mode, franchisees and brand holders or franchisees are playing a game of interests

Xu Yong believes that in the future development of the express industry, the tragedy of CCES is inevitable, and the transformation to self-supporting is an inevitable choice. There are risks in transformation, but the risk of not transforming is greater. Xu Yong said that the earlier marijn Dekkers repeatedly stated to investors in Berlin, Germany: the transaction of the business department (producing transparent plastic and foam chemicals) is expected to be transformed by the end of this year, and the lower the cost of transformation

among enterprises that have successfully transformed, SF is a typical case. SF has achieved its rebirth in the form of acquisition and joint-stock system in five years. The transformation of enterprises should not be carried out in a hurry, but step by step is the right way

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